Recruitment - Last 5 years - 1440 in, 2480 out!

[Purple_twiglet]

Heres some interesting stats from Hansard - inflow / outflow figures for the last 5 years. Any comments?

Year Inflow Outflow
2003 340 540
2004 220 570
2005 240 420
2006 240 380
2007 220 300
2008 180 270

 

[yicker]

Are there any figures as to where in their career the "outflows" were?

 

[all_purple_now]

I wonder if the bigger outflows 2003-5 were due to reconfiguration?

APN

 

[Karma]

Any comments?

Needs a bit more substance to make it meaningful.

What was the division of New Entry and Ex Service? Ex service are more quickly employable but probably come across at awkward ranks/ rates to deploy.

What was the division of rating entry and orificer entry? direct entry officers are of very limited use for far too long, something I have serious disagreement with. DE Officer entry doesn't appear to match the RNR requirement for officers.

What was the age profile on entry? How much employability have the new entrants got?

What was the rank/ seniority/ age structure at outflow?

Was the outflow pre or post deployment? More pertinently how many of the leavers were because they don't want to deploy; stopping the WR/ SRs mess bar from falling over isn't a key military task!

I'd also ask what the attrition rate was on new entry through the process, how many dropped out before getting to the end of the recruiting and NE training process. From my experience this is extremely badly managed with problems including; AFCOs not responding to enquiries, units not following up on AFCO enquiries, individuals not making the time to get through the recruiting process, units not processing entry to start getting people paid, delays, cancellations and hassle around training dates, complacency about getting people to a deployable state etc.

Outcomes do include issues around sustainability of RTCs and specialisations/ branches and frankly until the RNR sorts out that tension recruiting will continues to be hard although I'd be a little more sanguine about the opportunities to clear out and open opportunities for employment and promotion. There needs to be some clear direction from the centre about that particular issue, and a bit more than the bland platitudes of the last couple of years.

 

[all_purple_now]

direct entry officers are of very limited use for far too long, something I have serious disagreement with. DE Officer entry doesn't appear to match the RNR requirement for officers.

Was the outflow pre or post deployment? More pertinently how many of the leavers were because they don't want to deploy; stopping the WR/ SRs mess bar from falling over isn't a key military task!

Under the old system, it was possible to go NE -> Raleigh -> CC/CW class -> AIB -> BRNC -> JO Training -> branch, without being put in branch as a JR (FWIW, I spent 2 1/2 years as a JR between Raleigh & AIB). Unless I'm missing something, I thought the point of DE was to take out the first step in the chain & take about 18 months out of the training pipeline? I'd have thought AIB -> BRNC -> Fleet board would still take a minimum of two years; how long is it currently taking to get JOs to branch & onto the trained strength?

My impression is that most of the people at my unit who have left in relation to a deployment have resigned after they've come back. Do the numbers support this impression?

APN

 

[icantfly]

My impression is that most of the people at my unit who have left in relation to a deployment have resigned after they've come back. Do the numbers support this impression?

APN

I've seen some in my Unit do exactly the same, but mostly after they came back in 03. A lot of those who come in tend to leave within 12 months of joining - some to go into the RN or off to University, but also some simply because they're bored with the lack of training opportunities once they've moved beyond NE..

 

[Karma]

I thought the point of DE was to take out the first step in the chain & take about 18 months out of the training pipeline?

Which is fine if the service is content to have junior officers who have neither real experience or the immersive training that regulars have. By cutting out the first two years of five all we've managed to achieve is getting the wrong skillset to the trained strength quicker.

Personally I would have preferred to see a system where CWs spent a couple of years on the trained strength at AB/ LH level before attending AIB.

I'd have thought AIB -> BRNC -> Fleet board would still take a minimum of two years; how long is it currently taking to get JOs to branch & onto the trained strength?

Too long, and not long enough

The key point is why some RNR units still appear to be commission factories when the RNR needs predominantly ratings rather than officers.

My impression is that most of the people at my unit who have left in relation to a deployment have resigned after they've come back. Do the numbers support this impression?

No idea, but I suspect the profile and balance will have changed over the 5 years sampled.

 

[Karma]

.....but also some simply because they're bored with the lack of training opportunities once they've moved beyond NE..

Can we have this in big flashing lights!

 

[Nutty]

.....but also some simply because they're bored with the lack of training opportunities once they've moved beyond NE..

Can we have this in big flashing lights!

:roll: Perhaps it is because when they get deployed they do not get accommodated in six man cabins but 30 man mess decks or multi occupancy accommodation shore side. I say this because we have been assured many times in these pages that the latter is not acceptable accommodation to the modern young person.

Simple really, only deploy them to RFA's and Liners. :roll:


Nutty 8) :lol: 8) :lol:

 

[Karma]

Simple really, only deploy them to RFA's and Liners.

Very few deploy afloat at the moment, the majority are ashore in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere out that direction. A few still in the Balkans.

 

[Maxi_77]

Needs a bit more substance to make it meaningful.

I would have thought for an organisation which was below authorised strength that an outflow significantly larger than the inflow was in itself meaningful.

Now if you were to say that there are probably a number of contributory problems in here and we need to discover them all to make sure all the bases get covered to reverse this I would agree.

One problem that does seem to exist is that the marvelous training pipeline as structured is stopping people getting in as fast as they may present themselves, fixing that may at least give some breathing space and stem the downward spiral.

Of course there is almost certainly an equally important need to mimise wastage of those already in otherwise the service will become a headless chicken.

Suggesting we need more subsatnce sounds very much like the standard Brown response to a problem "lets have an enquiry". That is just putting off the inevitable that some one is going to either close down the RN or get their finger out their bum and do something to get recruits who want to join in faster, and make those who are already in more willing to hang on in there for a year or two more.

 

[Purple_twiglet]

Sorry for not posting original question - the text is below from todays (25/03) Hansard.

Karma makes some useful points - we need the context in which the figures can be set against - given the bow wave of retirements going through the system at the moment (lots of people currently in their mid - late 40's and onwards starting to go), I'd suggest a lot of the outflow is this older area. My concern remains the level of new entry, how many are we getting vice how many stay beyond 5 years? We know 5 year retention rates run at 50%, so of the 1440 in, in 5 years time we'll only have roughly 700 of them left. If retirements run at the predicted rate, we'll either have to extend a lot of people, or improve retention to keep the force structure as it stands.

Reserve Forces
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the (a) inflow, (b) outflow and (c) voluntary outflow rate of each volunteer reserve force was in each year since 2001. [265410]

Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Data on outflow reasons for any volunteer reserve force is not held. As such data on voluntary outflow is not available.


24 Mar 2009 : Column 278W

Royal Naval Reserve figures prior to 2003 is not available. The following table provides the total intake and outflow for the Royal Naval Reserve during the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008.

 

[scouse]

Heres some interesting stats from Hansard - inflow / outflow figures for the last 5 years. Any comments?

Year Inflow Outflow
2003 340 540
2004 220 570
2005 240 420
2006 240 380
2007 220 300
2008 180 270

As my Peers often remined me !!!!RETENTION RETENTION RETENTION :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:

 

[all_purple_now]

I thought the point of DE was to take out the first step in the chain & take about 18 months out of the training pipeline?

Which is fine if the service is content to have junior officers who have neither real experience or the immersive training that regulars have. By cutting out the first two years of five all we've managed to achieve is getting the wrong skillset to the trained strength quicker.

Can you expand on what you mean by 'the wrong skillset'?

Personally I would have preferred to see a system where CWs spent a couple of years on the trained strength at AB/ LH level before attending AIB.

I'd have thought AIB -> BRNC -> Fleet board would still take a minimum of two years; how long is it currently taking to get JOs to branch & onto the trained strength?

Too long, and not long enough

TBH, I don't see the benefit in putting everyone who joins with the intention of Officer entry through the lower deck. All this does is delay the entry of JOs onto the trained strength, and I would suggest might also put off some people from joining. I understand there was also a problem a few years back where the average age of an RNR S/Lt was the wrong side of 35 - making people spend 5-10 years in branch is not going to help.

Edit: I note P_T's comments about people leaving in their mid-late 40s - surely we need to be getting people through the system in such a way as to get a decent return of service?

I concede that for some people (including me) some branch time is invaluable; I don't think it's right or necessary for everyone.

Can you expand on 'Too long, & not long enough'? It seems to me that two years for AIB to Fleet Board is about right; how long is it taking to get people from this point onto the trained strength?

The key point is why some RNR units still appear to be commission factories when the RNR needs predominantly ratings rather than officers.

The impression I was under is that the RNR had a higher officer requirement in percentage terms, and DE/streamlining of JO training was intended to rectify a relative lack of JOs. While I don't know your background, can you substantiate that statement?

APN

 

[Karma]

Now if you were to say that there are probably a number of contributory problems in here and we need to discover them all to make sure all the bases get covered to reverse this I would agree.

Which is why I followed the statement up with a number of questions, some rhetorical, some less so. The RNR has a range of issues, some highlighted by the questions and statements I made. The excerpt is from Hansard, so it's dumbed down to the extent that it can be used in the house, but the information at that level is largely meaningless. All it says is that there has been a net outflow. That in itself does say something, but without context is there any real value in it? If we don't know what the profile looks like we can't respond to it. Of course it could be that you're suggesting that we just go and do stuff without any clarity around what stuff is the most effective. As an example, if we are losing a lot of people after a first deployment, has the five years getting them to the trained strength been beneficial? Probably not.

My view, as highlighted above, is that the RNR has yet to resolve the tension between units and specialisations. Units give the geographic footprint, recruitment, new entry training and a quasi-divisional system. Specialisations deliver operational capability to CINC. Both have an influence on retention and development. Policy changes under the previous CMR essentially drove a very big wedge between the two, to the detriment of the whole. Some personnel are never seen in a parent unit, spending all their time on specialisation issues, others never appear at specialisation training because they're too busy running the unit.

IMO those in specialisation should be spending some time in support of their unit, particularly around recruiting or RN in the Public Eye activities.

On the other side, some units have bloody awful management practices and don't do anything that encourages people to support. That's a basic Command failure. Frankly HQ sending out regular missives stating bland platitudes about the importance of command doesn't cut it, some positive leadership from the centre, and culling some of the less effective would be a huge benefit.

fwiw I am aware of some of the initiatives to help this, I have a range of views on their effectiveness. Some have the potential to be useful, others haven't. I'm a little wary that all we've done is invented a load of jobs for Cdrs, to churn out ever increasing numbers of bland platitudes rather than doing something to address the acknowledged problems.