Pompey News: "HMS Endurance - Flood was caused by Crew"

Discussion in 'The Fleet' started by soleil, Mar 18, 2010.

Welcome to the Navy Net aka Rum Ration

The UK's largest and busiest UNofficial RN website.

The heart of the site is the forum area, including:

  1. Bit like Pilot Error in the FAA For all fatal crashes???? :roll: :roll: :roll:
  2. Not at all scouse, sounds more like incompetant engineering management by the MEs. Skipper and EO surely have to be culpable in allowing the billet of that particular section to become vacant whilst deployed.
    But BZ to the lads for saving the day
  3. Heavy reading but a sensible conclusion from the facts presented. Just goes to show how valuable a pice of HBM could have been if only one of the air lines and corresponding connection had been marked.

    BZ's all round to the SSEP and ships company for keeping the Refd Plum afloat, wonder what fate awaits her.
  4. Yup alacrity my thoughts exactly, the Chief Tif although keen to fix the snag must be cursing himself.
  5. Levers_Aligned

    Levers_Aligned War Hero Moderator

    Nice one. If your findings are based upon the rather vague assumptions given in that report then you are indeed naive and indeed wrong. There are a whole host of feeder issues which were also part of the problem stretching back some years which were not even mentioned. Simply firing from the neck at what you assume to be culpable parties spells out a lot about you. If you knew Endurance, and knew that people involved, you'd understand.

    I'm sure 'the lads' would be grateful for your endorsement. FYI, there were some quality Command decisions made that day, some outstanding leadership and management strategies and exhaustive determination to never be beaten and lose the ship seen by all.

  6. Levers normally you put forward a convincing articulate argument. On this occassion I think not. Do not attempt to excuse the inexcusable.

    I do not see any mention of a safe system of work being implemented prior to the strainer clean, i.e. a Rip Out procedure. The Engineering standards displayed on Endurance appear to have been simply woeful.

    There seems to be no single point of failure, as is the case in many an incident. Without doubt the route cause of this accident stemmed from a systematic and general complacency displayed throughout the Chain of Command, from the IPT to FLEET to COMPORFLOT to FOST and finally down to the crew of the ship.

    I find it incomprehensible that the board of enquiry could not find enough evidence to warrant disciplinary action against any person considering the seriousness and the potentially dire human related consequences of the event that took place.

    Heads should have rolled at the higher echelons of the management chain.

    Have a nice day

  7. Levers_Aligned

    Levers_Aligned War Hero Moderator

    I was in the middle of typing a lengthy reply to your posting, but stopped. Take it from me, your reply is misguided and wrong on many (but not all) levels. I don't want to implicate myself, or any others involved in this matter. Suffice to say, there is a lot more to it than what you read.

  8. All could have been avoided by manual lock-off/tag out of the ship-side valve. Whether disconnecting the brassies pipework and reconnecting the wrong way somehow caused the valve to open during the event makes no never-mind. Hindsight is a wonderful thing - in this case, lesson learned ought to be simply to physically lock such valves (even with some sort of jury-rig) prior to b8ggering about downstream.
  9. Concur entirely, as someone else who has served in ENDURANCE, there is far more to this than the report says in black and white. Not least, the issue that for years the role and rig out of that ship has been changed far beyond the original design spec and the guys on the ground just have to deal with the tools they are given.

    BZ all round to the ship's company, I thank God I was never in that position because I used to get the sh*ts just doing BOST on that ship. NOthing is where you would expect it to be, and you just can't do DC in the way that you would expect to do it on any other warship - what with ridiculously wide passages and everything boxed off, plus a really high GZ curve and the "roll enhancement" tank. Once managed to get out of Pompey harbour without filling that, which was hairy....
  10. Levers_Aligned

    Levers_Aligned War Hero Moderator

    Again, you don't really have a great idea about the size, natue, position and operation of this valve. It is all there in the report, so I won't amplify what I know about it, nor about the rather pointless and ridiculous Risk Assessment attachment which serves no purpose than it masks the real issue, namely that for a ship of such size, vulnerability and volume, the ability to quickly void the space of floodwater was pisspoor to the point of hilarity. That fact is there in the report, staring you in the face as well, but not much talked about. This may not have been a man made error, but mechanical of systemic failure. The result could have been the same. If it were, we'd not be too hasty with our channeled critique of individual's performances pre-incident, would we? Had consideration, previous lessons and the voices of certain individuals been heeded beforehand, we'd still have an Ice Patrol Vessel.

    I'll freely add as well that if people think it is a cushy draft where one can become 'complacent' they should ask some of the ME senior ratings who have recently served on her since it's emergence from an eventful refit in 2004. Most of them were notice/outside afterwards having been burned out.

  11. My bold, you could say the same about the logistics and warfare departments, plus at one point a startlingly high number of 2 ringers....
  12. levers I appreciate your branch loyalty, but I base my 'naive' opinion on the report written. As a fellow Chief Tif(although different branch), I know what maintenance is risky at sea and what isnt, especially on a system that I wouldnt be completely familar with, and if I wasnt familar with it I certainly wouldnt **** off to the mess whilst the lads did it. I wouldve assessed the particular gains, if any, of the corrective maintenance to the inherent risks, to the fact, could this wait until we get alongside and get decent support, or to the point, B2 opdef(btw thats major capability degraded) and get back to Stanley.
    You do go on about how the lads are burned out, but this doesnt apply to the fact that the EO and Chief Tif made a poor decision and then failed to supervise correctly allayed to the poor systems knowledge led almost to the loss of the ship.
  13. Levers, I know perfectly well what a 12" sea valve looks like (have tagged out enough of them prior to launch / flood up) and although I have not been in Endurance's ER, as the HL suction it'll be somewhere inaccessible, particularly underway.

    More to the point, I was not having a pop in any way shape or form at the crew (collectively or individually), merely pointing out that rather than some of the "lessons learned" I've heard quoted, one of the more obvious ones might be to physically lock off the valve at the valve, (not via control air) thereby preventing oggin ingress. If such provision does not currently exist, over time it should be specified to be so. The ability to pump out the space is a different (and very valid) requirement.
  14. Levers_Aligned

    Levers_Aligned War Hero Moderator

    Guys. Very easy to pontificate, when all you have been used to is time-served and honoured systems of work which we all recognise. Fact is that in the case of Endurance, the situation was entirely different, for many different reasons. To make it into the world you know would have cost hundreds of thousands of pounds and take it from me, as crews came and went, as people came into roles and went on draft, the imperitive to make it more regimented and accountable was constantly in the minds of ships staff, balanced against resistance from some quarters to turn the Red Ship into a Grey Ship. Cultural that may be, but from what I know, you'll have to belive me that this was the case. The report rightly highlights areas that were wanting but they were known, challenged and put back to bed by certain ambitious individuals for whom risk and outcome were never ever going to be banner headlines, least of all set aginst their own personal goals. If you can't fill in the dots from that, then I can't amplify further.

    As for the valve, it wasn't able to be physically locked off in any way. The way they dealt witn it was the only way they knew and the only way it could be done. Were the world a beautiful place and or environment filled with perfect people, maybe a manual valve outboard of this air operated valve would have been installed, one that could be locked off effectively. But it wasn't. It wasn't deemed to be necessary. Just as it wasn't necessary to have an efffective method of removing floodwater, submersible fire pumps, a charged firemain (something else you probably din't know about) and more than one WEDA, one starter and oe discharge overboard. Eh? Find that incredible? Do you think the crew found that incredible? Do you think they flagged it up? Now do you see the depth of things?

    And for your information, the valve was bigger than your average 12" valeve found on sea suctions on Type 23s.

  15. Levers_Aligned

    Levers_Aligned War Hero Moderator

    So she was. And crewed by RN staff. But it is intrinsically difficult to install proven RN practice into an environment that physically does not support it. It has never loaned itself easily toward the adoption of RN practice in many different areas, much to the chagrin of countless staff who served on her. It was like trying to squeeze ten pound of shit into a five pound bag. All you can do is adapt, improvise, and tolerate. Recognised practice, as lauded and utilised by the righteous on here simply wasn't as clear focussed as many would love to believe. If complacency set it, it was at the end of a very long process of frustration, exahustive graft and plain battery of face against the floor. What appears to be a case of lazy matelots is as far from the truth as you will ever get. And you'd better take my word on that.

    And no one seems to pay much attention to the cack-handed manning scheme which was in force at the time which compounded the issue to the absolute max.

  16. Levers_Aligned

    Levers_Aligned War Hero Moderator

    Simple engineering practice is an easy concept, I agree. And yes, damned easy to pontificate about when safe in the cozy confines of one's own moralistic castle. At the coalface, however it can be different and when the environment you are working in is different by design, it isn't quite so majestically laid out. And yes, from what I know it was manned by engineers. What is your point there, please?
  17. It's simple - those serving on ENDR took pride in not 'really' being part of the 'Royal Navy' - a similar attitude I've found on Small Ships, and that has been expressed on here by Submariners, but probably best evidenced by 'Yachties'. Some of the cultural ethos that the Surface Fleet produces is a direct result of our environment - the physical fact our bulkheads are grey, decks need to be scrubbed daily, 30 man messes or small cabins for Officers and SRs etc etc. ENDR is a different ship - carpets in many places, en-suite cabins for most of the Ship's Company - and that in turn produces a slightly different mindset, one that may be a little less 'warry'.

    Add in the fact that most of ENDR's equipment is unique, and whilst Engineering Standards are Engineering Standards, it enables a mindset to be held that it* doesn't quite apply to them. This is exacerbated by back to back drafts for many people, which may have a deleterious effect.

    *'It' in this case is not just Engineering Standards, but also wider standards.

Share This Page