Reading the reports on the BBC News web-site, and other on-line UK press sites, about the apparent overstretch of the UK military (Troops shortage a clear danger) and the MoD's party line that the current situation is sustainable I cannot fail to see a parallel between the current situation and the NASA cock-up over Challenger.
As is well known, Challenger suffered a catstrophic failure shortly after launch - in the investigation it was revealed that the root cause of the explosion was an O-Ring seal which had failed due to the low temperatures encountered. While engineers suspected a high likelihood of failure, NASA management had brushed off their concerns and were much more optimistic. A good commentary on the different viewpoints can be found in the commentary on the official report by Richard Feynman, a Nobel prize winning physicist who worked on the Manhattan project and bongo player.
Quoting from the introduction of this section:
It appears that there are enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of a failure with loss of vehicle and of human life. The estimates range from roughly 1 in 100 to 1 in 100,000. The higher figures come from the working engineers, and the very low figures from management. What are the causes and consequences of this lack of agreement? Since 1 part in 100,000 would imply that one could put a Shuttle up each day for 300 years expecting to lose only one, we could properly ask "What is the cause of management's fantastic faith in the machinery?"
The parallel between the Mod saying "we can do it" in the face of comments from people like Gen Dannatt, Gen Jackson, the Commons Defence Committee, unnamed serving officers, etc. is striking.
In the his conclusions, Feynmann identifies that time and cost constraints condemned the engineers to flying the shuttle with reduced safety margins, however, these reductions wer recognised and understood at the engineering level. He then goes on to conclude that:
Official management, on the other hand, claims to believe the probability of failure is a thousand times less. One reason for this may be an attempt to assure the government of NASA perfection and success in order to ensure the supply of funds. The other may be that they sincerely believed it to be true, demonstrating an almost incredible lack of communication between themselves and their working engineers.
The cost of the NASA management's short-sightedness was 7 astronauts (who all knew the risk of spaceflight) and a costly remediation programme. The cost to the MOD in terms of lives in Afghanistan and Iraq is already far greater than this. How much longer will the mandarins of the MOD delude themselves that the current situation is sustainable?
As is well known, Challenger suffered a catstrophic failure shortly after launch - in the investigation it was revealed that the root cause of the explosion was an O-Ring seal which had failed due to the low temperatures encountered. While engineers suspected a high likelihood of failure, NASA management had brushed off their concerns and were much more optimistic. A good commentary on the different viewpoints can be found in the commentary on the official report by Richard Feynman, a Nobel prize winning physicist who worked on the Manhattan project and bongo player.
Quoting from the introduction of this section:
It appears that there are enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of a failure with loss of vehicle and of human life. The estimates range from roughly 1 in 100 to 1 in 100,000. The higher figures come from the working engineers, and the very low figures from management. What are the causes and consequences of this lack of agreement? Since 1 part in 100,000 would imply that one could put a Shuttle up each day for 300 years expecting to lose only one, we could properly ask "What is the cause of management's fantastic faith in the machinery?"
The parallel between the Mod saying "we can do it" in the face of comments from people like Gen Dannatt, Gen Jackson, the Commons Defence Committee, unnamed serving officers, etc. is striking.
In the his conclusions, Feynmann identifies that time and cost constraints condemned the engineers to flying the shuttle with reduced safety margins, however, these reductions wer recognised and understood at the engineering level. He then goes on to conclude that:
Official management, on the other hand, claims to believe the probability of failure is a thousand times less. One reason for this may be an attempt to assure the government of NASA perfection and success in order to ensure the supply of funds. The other may be that they sincerely believed it to be true, demonstrating an almost incredible lack of communication between themselves and their working engineers.
The cost of the NASA management's short-sightedness was 7 astronauts (who all knew the risk of spaceflight) and a costly remediation programme. The cost to the MOD in terms of lives in Afghanistan and Iraq is already far greater than this. How much longer will the mandarins of the MOD delude themselves that the current situation is sustainable?
