New 4th Manoeuvre Unit announced

Bergen

ADC
Wessex_Man said:
NZ_Bootneck said:
Rifleman, (I thought that was Chuck Connors, anyone under 35 will have to Google that one),is under the impression that I have never worked in co-operation with Perce, well sorry mate, but I have had that misfortune.
Example. A Welsh Guardsman (GUARDSMAN for ferks sake) collapsing in a heap and crying, 200 metres after diembarking from an LC down sunny San Carlos way, because his bergan was too heavy. That is why the taffs where still embarked when the Exocet hit, cause they couldn't hack the bimble :roll: .
too :mrgreen: . Also don't come the old that was 25 odd years ago, things are different now bollix, as from what I can see it ain't changed much.

Yeah, well, ref the Welsh Guards at San Carlos collapsing, crying etc: you know, mate, hypothermia has a tendency to do that to a man. 3 hours bobbing about in the LCs getting soaked through on what should have been a 20 min run-in to an established beach head! Someone screwed up big time, for sure... and it wasn't Army men driving the things! Oh, and what about all those blue rucksacs from Millets - I'm sure you saw them? - plus, of course, the shoddy boots, lack of windproofs etc? Yep, they were so well equipped! A pish poor reflection on the system, but not, I think, on the blokes. Yes, and we all know about the Guardsmen wearing plastic bags over their boots - keep the shine, see! Reality was that the poor sods were trying to keep feet dry for as long as poss - ref THOSE boots. Truth is, it was a bloody miracle that no-one actually died of hypothermia on that first day ashore.

Ref the Bluff Cove disaster: ships were bombed, as a matter of fact - not hit by Exocets, but let's not be too pedantic and worry about the facts, eh? The ranking officer in situ on the fateful day was a RM expert in amphib ops ... but I'll not cast any aspersions re decisions made/ not made at the time, in the midst of a confused war environment.

As an experienced member of the Corps of a certain vintage, you'll no doubt be aware of the unfortunate "blue on blues" inflicted on Army patrols in W Belfast, circa 1972, by RM; not to mention the occasional ND in Bessbrook Mill, including - in one notable instance - of an 84mm!

Possibly you'll also recall the RM patrols in the Radfan who put fixed ropes everywhere? Funny thing is, however, Army patrols managed to walk/ climb same routes regularly without said aids.

My point here is not to denigrate anyone - we can all, if so inclined, come up with "catalogues of crapness" to cast others in a poor light, and the truth is that in war - as in life - stupid things get done, & unfortunate things can happen to anyone, Green Beret wearers or not!

Generally speaking, you'll find no greater admirer of RM than the average Soldier, and I imagine that the Riflemen who serve in 3 Cdo Bde will be extremely proud of the association and very pleased to be there. We shouldn't, BTW, forget that the original Commandos were all Army: RM came to the role, quite reluctantly in many quarters, late in the day, and only assumed the role exclusively post '45 because it was a means to guarantee the continuation of the Corps as a separate entity.

The tone of some comments here suggest that SOME Marines are a bit "up themselves" and need to get out more. "Percy Pongo" is obviously an object of contempt to some of you - oh, well...! Next time my Brother (24 years service in the second raters of the Infantry you so despise) speaks in defence of RM, I'll direct him to this site so he can see what great team players some of you are.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well this is a pile of factually incorrect bull-shite:-

1. Canberra's final run south with Percy aboard was very different from the previous ones. The crew of the Great White Whale noted how hardly any training was done by the embarked forces but lots of whinging and whining about dinner queues. A lot different from the Paras and Commandos who had spent every waking minute honing skills during the transit south.

Once ashore the Welsh Guards found that their tailored combats with the permanent stitched creases might have looked fine in Pirbright but were fcuk all good for yomping. This is the problem with taking ceremonial infantry and trying to use them as soldiers. They sailed to Bluff Cove because they couldn't yomp. They couldn't yomp because they were unfit for the task.

Once at Bluff Cove their own C.O. didn't know where they were and neither did 5th Infantry Brigade. It was an accident that Royal Marine Major E. S-T discovered that they were on the LSS and dangerously exposed. They refused to disembark because the LC's that he rustled up were carrying 105mm pack ammo and their Company Commander refused to allow it against the best advice of this RM Major.

This RM Major stormed ashore and attempted to get the Welsh Guards C.O. to order his men off the LSS. By then it was too late and a pair of A-4 Skyhawks dropped iron bombs and the rest as they say is history.

2. After Dunkirk the only effective fighting force left was RM (most of Perces' weapons had sand in them and were in France). They held the line until Perce could re-equip and re-train. As soon as that was achieved RM Commando training got under way and at the end of WWII it was Perce who didn't want the role that RM has held ever since. The same as Perce abandoned the SAS, sniping and any other military skills that got in the way of shiney boots and cake and arse ceremonials.

3. As for blue on blues in Belfast......don't get me started on that one........I worked with almost every infantry unit deployed there and on the border and on good days they were shite. The only wonder was that there were not more 'accidents'. One of the most dangerous places to be was anywhere near Perce at an unloading sangar. The 84mm incident was not at Bessie it was in Girdwood Park. An inexcusable incident and lucky it was 'only' a TPTP. The only excuse I can offer is that the L/Cpl responsible was a Taff and a particularly bone one at that.

4. You seem perplexed that RM placed assist ropes at Radfan? We did the same at Gibraltar Perce. Must be a habit.

RM
 
Just a historic fact --------- in 1940 Army Commando's were formed


The first seaborne assault raid was done by Army commando's June 1941

It was all part of the Combined ops and the Special service organisation.

In 1942 the first Royal Marine commando was formed [No. 40]

Special Service Brigades usually contained one RM commando unit
[1st Special Service Brigade was made up from
3,4,6 Commando
45 RM Commando
1 and 8 troops of No.10 Inter allied Commando
and units from RM 4th Special Service Brigade.

So its the turn of the wheel.
Manoevre Unit --------------------------------or Special Service Combined OPs.
 
I

In_my_day

Guest
Wessex_Man said:
Yeah, well, ref the Welsh Guards at San Carlos collapsing, crying etc: you know, mate, hypothermia has a tendency to do that to a man. 3 hours bobbing about in the LCs getting soaked through on what should have been a 20 min run-in to an established beach head! Someone screwed up big time, for sure... and it wasn't Army men driving the things! Oh, and what about all those blue rucksacs from Millets - I'm sure you saw them? - plus, of course, the shoddy boots, lack of windproofs etc? Yep, they were so well equipped! A pish poor reflection on the system, but not, I think, on the blokes. Yes, and we all know about the Guardsmen wearing plastic bags over their boots - keep the shine, see! Reality was that the poor sods were trying to keep feet dry for as long as poss - ref THOSE boots. Truth is, it was a bloody miracle that no-one actually died of hypothermia on that first day ashore.

Ref the Bluff Cove disaster: ships were bombed, as a matter of fact - not hit by Exocets, but let's not be too pedantic and worry about the facts, eh? The ranking officer in situ on the fateful day was a RM expert in amphib ops ... but I'll not cast any aspersions re decisions made/ not made at the time, in the midst of a confused war environment.

As an experienced member of the Corps of a certain vintage, you'll no doubt be aware of the unfortunate "blue on blues" inflicted on Army patrols in W Belfast, circa 1972, by RM; not to mention the occasional ND in Bessbrook Mill, including - in one notable instance - of an 84mm!

Possibly you'll also recall the RM patrols in the Radfan who put fixed ropes everywhere? Funny thing is, however, Army patrols managed to walk/ climb same routes regularly without said aids.

My point here is not to denigrate anyone - we can all, if so inclined, come up with "catalogues of crapness" to cast others in a poor light, and the truth is that in war - as in life - stupid things get done, & unfortunate things can happen to anyone, Green Beret wearers or not!

Generally speaking, you'll find no greater admirer of RM than the average Soldier, and I imagine that the Riflemen who serve in 3 Cdo Bde will be extremely proud of the association and very pleased to be there. We shouldn't, BTW, forget that the original Commandos were all Army: RM came to the role, quite reluctantly in many quarters, late in the day, and only assumed the role exclusively post '45 because it was a means to guarantee the continuation of the Corps as a separate entity.

The tone of some comments here suggest that SOME Marines are a bit "up themselves" and need to get out more. "Percy Pongo" is obviously an object of contempt to some of you - oh, well...! Next time my Brother (24 years service in the second raters of the Infantry you so despise) speaks in defence of RM, I'll direct him to this site so he can see what great team players some of you are.

W-M whilst I have to agree that some of the posts in this thread are bollocks your last post must join that group. Bergen has answered many of the points but I had to say that the "factual" points you make are as purile as many of the "anti-pongo" comments made above.

For my part I believe that the RIFLES will be used as a MANOUEVRE unit. I also believe that if they come with the attitude of being part of one of the the UK's only permanently constituted deployable Bde (rather than "we're Army/Inf/attached or most especially "we're the RIFLES and have no need to adapt to an established and Operationally proven way of doing business" everything will be fine. On the part of the Corps I think that this should be looked upon as an opportunity rather than some threat to the established order.

As to the AACC, it is naive in the extreme to believe that is irrelavent to their role in 3 Cdo Bde. To suggest that they will only do follow up Ops must be nonsense if the premise that they are there to allow a Cdo unit to deploy independently and still have a 3-unit Bde available is correct.

IMD
 

Bergen

ADC
In_my_day said:
Wessex_Man said:
Yeah, well, ref the Welsh Guards at San Carlos collapsing, crying etc: you know, mate, hypothermia has a tendency to do that to a man. 3 hours bobbing about in the LCs getting soaked through on what should have been a 20 min run-in to an established beach head! Someone screwed up big time, for sure... and it wasn't Army men driving the things! Oh, and what about all those blue rucksacs from Millets - I'm sure you saw them? - plus, of course, the shoddy boots, lack of windproofs etc? Yep, they were so well equipped! A pish poor reflection on the system, but not, I think, on the blokes. Yes, and we all know about the Guardsmen wearing plastic bags over their boots - keep the shine, see! Reality was that the poor sods were trying to keep feet dry for as long as poss - ref THOSE boots. Truth is, it was a bloody miracle that no-one actually died of hypothermia on that first day ashore.

Ref the Bluff Cove disaster: ships were bombed, as a matter of fact - not hit by Exocets, but let's not be too pedantic and worry about the facts, eh? The ranking officer in situ on the fateful day was a RM expert in amphib ops ... but I'll not cast any aspersions re decisions made/ not made at the time, in the midst of a confused war environment.

As an experienced member of the Corps of a certain vintage, you'll no doubt be aware of the unfortunate "blue on blues" inflicted on Army patrols in W Belfast, circa 1972, by RM; not to mention the occasional ND in Bessbrook Mill, including - in one notable instance - of an 84mm!

Possibly you'll also recall the RM patrols in the Radfan who put fixed ropes everywhere? Funny thing is, however, Army patrols managed to walk/ climb same routes regularly without said aids.

My point here is not to denigrate anyone - we can all, if so inclined, come up with "catalogues of crapness" to cast others in a poor light, and the truth is that in war - as in life - stupid things get done, & unfortunate things can happen to anyone, Green Beret wearers or not!

Generally speaking, you'll find no greater admirer of RM than the average Soldier, and I imagine that the Riflemen who serve in 3 Cdo Bde will be extremely proud of the association and very pleased to be there. We shouldn't, BTW, forget that the original Commandos were all Army: RM came to the role, quite reluctantly in many quarters, late in the day, and only assumed the role exclusively post '45 because it was a means to guarantee the continuation of the Corps as a separate entity.

The tone of some comments here suggest that SOME Marines are a bit "up themselves" and need to get out more. "Percy Pongo" is obviously an object of contempt to some of you - oh, well...! Next time my Brother (24 years service in the second raters of the Infantry you so despise) speaks in defence of RM, I'll direct him to this site so he can see what great team players some of you are.

W-M whilst I have to agree that some of the posts in this thread are bollocks your last post must join that group. Bergen has answered many of the points but I had to say that the "factual" points you make are as purile as many of the "anti-pongo" comments made above.

For my part I believe that the RIFLES will be used as a MANOUEVRE unit. I also believe that if they come with the attitude of being part of one of the the UK's only permanently constituted deployable Bde (rather than "we're Army/Inf/attached or most especially "we're the RIFLES and have no need to adapt to an established and Operationally proven way of doing business" everything will be fine. On the part of the Corps I think that this should be looked upon as an opportunity rather than some threat to the established order.

As to the AACC, it is naive in the extreme to believe that is irrelavent to their role in 3 Cdo Bde. To suggest that they will only do follow up Ops must be nonsense if the premise that they are there to allow a Cdo unit to deploy independently and still have a 3-unit Bde available is correct.

IMD


What happened at Bluff Cove [or more accurately Fitzroy Inlet] was caused by a number of factors and there was blame enough to go round for everyone.

However the root cause of the blame is unavoidable and it was the inability of the Welsh Guards to move cross-country on foot. The fact that at no point during the campaign did 5 Brigade achieve functional coherence is a simple corollary of that fact.

The best and most impartial account of what happened was written by Robert S. Bolia who writes for the US Military Review:

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_84/ai_n14699964

Here is a quote from the article......the entire thing is worth reading for anyone who is interested.

Relations between the Royal Navy and the British Army (represented by the newly formed 5 Brigade) were strained - at best. Many believed the Army had inserted itself into the war only to accrue its share of glory, despite being unprepared for amphibious operations in the South Atlantic's winter weather.

Commodore Michael Clapp, who had overseen the nearly flawless landings of 3 Commando Brigade, was especially critical: "What I did not appreciate...was the lack of understanding of joint operations by the Army Brigade....nor the near nonexistant communications that were to dog that brigade. The blame for much of this inefficiency should not be laid at the door of [Brigadier] Tony Wilson [commander of 5 Brigade] and his staff. Delaying the dispatch of these reinforcements on the assumption that any plan to recapture the Falkland Islands was bound to fail suggests that the Army staff did not want to be part of that presumed disaster in the first place. Also, when the Brigade was dispatched it was without two of its three original major manouvre units, and it had no logistical backup and little significant training - certainly none in joint Navy/Army or amphibious operations. That they were to fight and not garrison in one of the most complicated of military roles in a sub-Antarctic winter must have been a disagreeable surprise to the Army staff.

Perhaps 5 Brigade's soldiers behaviour on board the transports in San Carlos Water colored Clapp's view. They became notorious for lack of order and discipline and their penchant for stealing sailor's personal belongings. One Army officer said, "The Navy is well used to having Royal Marines and other Green Beret-wearing members of Commando Forces on board. They therefore assumed the Welsh Guards would be the same - if not something similar. However, it had rapidly become clear even to the saltiest of sailors that the Welsh Guards were nothing like as well prepared as they needed to be. After confusions and difficulties, [the commander of] Intrepid had put the soldiers ashore, only to be recalled back to pick them up again. This entailed quite a bit of work, with the LCM's ferrying the troops back on board, and much disruption of a ship that was difficult to operate under normal circumstances. The sailors were shocked at the condition of the Welsh Guards when they returned after just a night ashore - wet, filthy, miserable - and obviously ineffective. Their yardstick was the Royal Marines, who come back on board after arduous exercises in good order, even if they do leave muddy boot prints throughout the nice, clean ship


Read the entire article and you will see that a Royal Marine Major E. S-T gave a direct order to 2 Welsh Guards company commanders to get their men off Sir Galahad. The Welsh Guards officers refused this direct order mainly because it would entail the Welsh Guards being required to march from Fitzroy Inlet to Bluff Cove.... a distance of 5 miles.

It infuriates me when half-baked fcuk-wits cannot get simple facts straight.


RM
 

Wessex_Man

Midshipman
Dear all,

Have been very clear that I'm not in the business of bashing RM; THE essential point made was that it's always possible to find grounds for casting aspertions on others, if that's what's wanted.

No sensible observer would dispute that 5 Bde was unprepared for a war fighting role in '82, but that was primarily a reflection of muddled thinking in Whitehall re its intended role. Many Army people remain bemused/ angry to this day as to why Guards battalions were taken from ceremonial duties and deployed South, instead of any number of other units that were rather better prepared. Col Tim Spicer's comments in this regard are very telling; particularly with ref to equipment and the problems of procuring even the basics that anyone with half a brain should have realised would be essential.

Quite simply, everything suggests that the "lords & masters" intended 5 Bde to be used as a garrison force post cessation of hostilities, and nothing more. Not the fault of the Soldiers that the fu*!tards back home decided to change the plan without regard for the reality that these units were ill-equipped & undertrained. But, regardless of the mishaps/ foul ups, and despite lack of essential preparation, when push came to shove soldiers from this ad hoc brigade did the business, notably on Tumbledown. This, I feel, reflects creditibly on the men in said units.

Yes, of course, I'm playing fast & loose with a few details; being "a bit naughty" to wind people up. I'll simply reiterate my earlier point about "catalogues of crapness" - easiest game in the World to pick unfortunate incidents/ bog ups and extrapolate from that a general denigration of a whole group! What is depressing is the apparent proclivity of more than a few RM to perpetuate the view that "Percy Pongo" is universally inept.

Well, members of my family fought & died in many parts of the World a long time before anyone had ever thought of "commandos", "airborne forces" and all the rest, and the consensus view is that they did not, by and large, do a bad job; frequently in the face of considerable adversity. BTW, in my experience, the overwheming majority of Infantry soldiers (incl Guardsmen!) are not in the slightest interested in ceremonial, and if/ when compelled to do it find the whole business a huge embuggerance that gets in the way of proper training. But, it seems, the obsessions of a few "drill pigs" (not, BTW, an entirely unknown creature in RM either!) are to be adduced by some to sustain the view that all Soldiers are a bunch of boneheads who would rather shine boots, march in review order, salute etc than do any serious military training.

Yes, we all know the Commando Course is very demanding, and you will not find many Soldiers who have anything less than the highest regard for "Royal". That stated, the actual differential between RM & Army Infantry is not that great, and most infanteers, given appropriate preparation, should be able to pass AACC. My authority for stating this? A cousin who used to command the Commando School (probably trained half you old buggers out there!), and also served extensively with the Army: who, BTW, is also notably lacking in the prejudices so evident in some hereabouts.

Best wishes,

Wessex_Man.
 

Bergen

ADC
Wessex_Man said:
Dear all,

Have been very clear that I'm not in the business of bashing RM; THE essential point made was that it's always possible to find grounds for casting aspertions on others, if that's what's wanted.

No sensible observer would dispute that 5 Bde was unprepared for a war fighting role in '82, but that was primarily a reflection of muddled thinking in Whitehall re its intended role. Many Army people remain bemused/ angry to this day as to why Guards battalions were taken from ceremonial duties and deployed South, instead of any number of other units that were rather better prepared. Col Tim Spicer's comments in this regard are very telling; particularly with ref to equipment and the problems of procuring even the basics that anyone with half a brain should have realised would be essential.

Quite simply, everything suggests that the "lords & masters" intended 5 Bde to be used as a garrison force post cessation of hostilities, and nothing more. Not the fault of the Soldiers that the fu*!tards back home decided to change the plan without regard for the reality that these units were ill-equipped & undertrained. But, regardless of the mishaps/ foul ups, and despite lack of essential preparation, when push came to shove soldiers from this ad hoc brigade did the business, notably on Tumbledown. This, I feel, reflects creditibly on the men in said units.

Yes, of course, I'm playing fast & loose with a few details; being "a bit naughty" to wind people up. I'll simply reiterate my earlier point about "catalogues of crapness" - easiest game in the World to pick unfortunate incidents/ bog ups and extrapolate from that a general denigration of a whole group! What is depressing is the apparent proclivity of more than a few RM to perpetuate the view that "Percy Pongo" is universally inept.

Well, members of my family fought & died in many parts of the World a long time before anyone had ever thought of "commandos", "airborne forces" and all the rest, and the consensus view is that they did not, by and large, do a bad job; frequently in the face of considerable adversity. BTW, in my experience, the overwheming majority of Infantry soldiers (incl Guardsmen!) are not in the slightest interested in ceremonial, and if/ when compelled to do it find the whole business a huge embuggerance that gets in the way of proper training. But, it seems, the obsessions of a few "drill pigs" (not, BTW, an entirely unknown creature in RM either!) are to be adduced by some to sustain the view that all Soldiers are a bunch of boneheads who would rather shine boots, march in review order, salute etc than do any serious military training.

Yes, we all know the Commando Course is very demanding, and you will not find many Soldiers who have anything less than the highest regard for "Royal". That stated, the actual differential between RM & Army Infantry is not that great, and most infanteers, given appropriate preparation, should be able to pass AACC. My authority for stating this? A cousin who used to command the Commando School (probably trained half you old buggers out there!), and also served extensively with the Army: who, BTW, is also notably lacking in the prejudices so evident in some hereabouts.

Best wishes,

Wessex_Man.

The Army leadership was only partly to blame. Basic soldiering skills at all levels were non-existant. You can't blame a General in Whitehall for Perce not being able to keep himself clean on ship. You can't blame politicians for an army battalion routinely thieving from ship-mates. You can't blame lack of equipment for 2 army officers refusing a direct order to get their men out of danger. You can't point a finger at anyone for a soldier not being able to yomp unless you first point it at that soldier. You will find that one of the biggest medical problems encountered was not hypothermia rather it was hyperthermia. M&AW found heat stressed guardsmen scattered along the line of march who had attempted to march wearing quilts under their combat gear. They literally didn't have a clue. Their NCO's didn't have a clue and neither did their officers.

Will some infantry be able to pass AACC? Of course.

Are some individual infantry soldiers potentially at least as good as some Royal Marines? Probably.

This is not the point. There is not an infantry unit that I ever worked with that had the cohesion, expertise or leadership to come close to a RM Commando. To state this is not denigrating the army, rather it is a simple fact.

RM
 
I

In_my_day

Guest
NZ_Bootneck said:
Oh dear more Perce bashing, will they cope? Bergan to try and convince these deluded ferkwits that the Rifles will be anything but a quickfix seems imposible. Well will just have to wait until after the 1st April (BZ to the dick at the MOD who came up with that one) to see how they're tasked.

Wessex man Royal had to put up with the same weather and the same dire equipment, although in most cases bootnecks had purchased their own Bergans and extra/better clothing. Nuff said.
Hopefully, I'll be able to eat humble pie, I'm quite willing to if proved wrong.
Aye
Ian.

I don't believe that the RIFLES are a quick fix, this suggests a immediate shortfall or failing. My understanding is that the realisation that the Corps needs to be able to deploy the Bde at all times (undoudtedly fuelled by MoD politics) has led to this decision. Experience shows that there is often a Unit deployed elsewhere when the brown hits the fan. The answer, not a quick fix, is a square Bde. The Corps cannot increase its manpower without authority from the budgetary gods, blessed by FLEET, therefore IOT produce a square Bde (3 deployable Units) a 4th Cdo Unit is required. Be realistic could the Corps recruit another 600 men even if given the green light? I'm sure some SO could put this into TLAs but in essence I think that's the wider view.

On a more personal front, I'm of the opinion that knocking the move will only serve to fuel any tensions felt within the Bde. Isn't this the same as banning shoreleave before anyone f***s up!!

Again Bergen has succinctly answered some of the points ref the FI in 82. I would add that whilst it is not the fault of the individual soldier that he has been employed on PD; there is obviously a systemic failure in the trg system that allows a unit's OC to degrade to such an extent that it is incapable of its primary function.

IMD
 

Wessex_Man

Midshipman
I would add that whilst it is not the fault of the individual soldier that he has been employed on PD; there is obviously a systemic failure in the trg system that allows a unit's OC to degrade to such an extent that it is incapable of its primary function.

IMD[/quote]

Couldn't agree more! Indeed this is the most common criticism of the Guards voiced in the Army. That stated, you do, I take it, concede that 2 SG did actually, despite all shortcomings etc, fight and win a hard battle on Tumbledown?! Or, is there now on Planet RM systematic denial of any reality that does not concur with the view that "Royal" is the be all and end all of all things military?
 

Bergen

ADC
I don't believe that the RIFLES are a quick fix, this suggests a immediate shortfall or failing. My understanding is that the realisation that the Corps needs to be able to deploy the Bde at all times (undoudtedly fuelled by MoD politics) has led to this decision. Experience shows that there is often a Unit deployed elsewhere when the brown hits the fan. The answer, not a quick fix, is a square Bde. The Corps cannot increase its manpower without authority from the budgetary gods, blessed by FLEET, therefore IOT produce a square Bde (3 deployable Units) a 4th Cdo Unit is required. Be realistic could the Corps recruit another 600 men even if given the green light? I'm sure some SO could put this into TLAs but in essence I think that's the wider view.

On a more personal front, I'm of the opinion that knocking the move will only serve to fuel any tensions felt within the Bde. Isn't this the same as banning shoreleave before anyone f***s up!!

Again Bergen has succinctly answered some of the points ref the FI in 82. I would add that whilst it is not the fault of the individual soldier that he has been employed on PD; there is obviously a systemic failure in the trg system that allows a unit's OC to degrade to such an extent that it is incapable of its primary function.

IMD
[/quote]

I agree that the 4th Manoeuvre Unit is not the long-term answer and here we turn full circle; in my humble opinion it would be a relatively easy task to form another RM Commando with a little lateral thinking by allowing RM to recruit directly from the army. The overall costs would be relatively minimal because there would be almost no CAPEX and long term costs would be almost identical and constrained within the present defence budget. It could be done within a year of authorisation although the sausage factory would have to be resourced appropriately.

There would be no shortage of volunteers especially from Les Paras and the more able infantry units. The down side would be that Perce would lose a battalion of its better soldiers and officers but spread right across the Army this should not present too much of a problem. The Corps could assimilate 600 men spread out within 3 Cdo Brigade and would be no doubt grateful to be able to expand with a badly needed 4th unit. The practical way to do this would be to resurrect 41 Independent RM Commando which always fulfilled an emergency plug and play for 3 Commando Brigade but which it was never really part of.

Anyone transferring across would become a Royal Marine, not an attached rank and all seniority for NCO's and officers would be transferred with them. To use a phrase that I hate it could be a win-win situation for everyone.

I agree that individual army units did perform down south...The Scots Guards in particular [although that never surprised me] and The Parachute Regiment [who had a singularly effective reason to perform well.....they were cheek by jowl with their biggest rivals in the swagger and big brass balls department and RM wasn't going to let them rest on their laurels].

There is no such thing as Planet RM although some suspect it may lie somewhere beyond Uranus. Royal makes mistakes and is far from perfect but anyone who did transfer could not find a better home nor a warmer welcome.

RM
 
I

In_my_day

Guest
Bergen said:
1. by allowing RM to recruit directly from the army. The overall costs would be relatively minimal because there would be almost no CAPEX and long term costs would be almost identical and constrained within the present defence budget. It could be done within a year of authorisation although the sausage factory would have to be resourced appropriately.

2.There would be no shortage of volunteers ...

3.Anyone transferring across would become a Royal Marine, not an attached rank and all seniority for NCO's and officers would be transferred with them.

1. Realistically there is no way that the Army would allow mass transfer to the RM of personnel they have recruited, paid to train, paid to Ph 3 train and then planned the future promotion, manning and deployment programme of the Inf on. It will never happen.

2. I disagree that there would be no shortage of volunteers, go to ARRSE and read the relevant threads. There is still the problem of the older men passing the AACC or whatever they would do.

3. This is the most contentious point. How many times have people heard the comment “that Mne/JNCO/SNCO would be a JNCO/SNCO/WO if he was in the Army"? This isn't denigrating Army/Inf pers but ,IMHO, whilst the average RM NCO is probably no better than many Inf equivalents the top 1/3 of said ranks are better in terms of self reliance, confidence, aptitude, attitude and professional ability. Now turn this around and think about the fact that you are inviting Army SNCOs to become Tp Sgts in an organisation of which they have absolutely no experience. With the exchange draft men this is not as great a problem because they have the guidance of the other Sgts, TQ, CSM, etc. What you suggest is that 25-33% of the commanders within the Bde come from the Army, possibly not even the Inf. If it's this easy disband the Corps transfer all pers to the Inf, RLC, etc and roulemont units through an Amphib Bde. Then there is the thorny issue of seniority and the effect that this would have on promotion. I know of 3 instances where Army personnel have transferred to the GD world (2 SNCOs, the other a JNCO). The move of the SNCOs both upset the drafting and promotion plot and caused bad feeling within the branch into which they went. What about the difference in SQ courses (PT, PW, HW, S to name a few).

I'm sure this will be an issue for a long time to come.

IMD
 
Once at Bluff Cove their own C.O. didn't know where they were and neither did 5th Infantry Brigade. It was an accident that Royal Marine Major E. S-T discovered that they were on the LSS and dangerously exposed. They refused to disembark because the LC's that he rustled up were carrying 105mm pack ammo and their Company Commander refused to allow it against the best advice of this RM Major.

Correct me if I am wrong but did not the Company Commander state it was a safety ruling that troops and ammunition should not be transported together in peacetime.

RM Major blew a gasket and informed CC we are not in peacetime we are at war!!!!
 
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