Interesting article in the current Economist about the use of information on private individuals by government. THE internet, argues Kim Cameron, who works as â€œIdentity Architectâ€ at Microsoft, â€œwas built without a way to know who and what you are connecting toâ€. That is bad enough in the private sector, where the only thing at stake is money. For dealing with government, it is potentially catastrophic. Technology canâ€”just aboutâ€”tell how an internet user got online. It can check the authenticity of passwords and logins, and validate smart cards or biometric checks. But such data, even if encrypted, can be stolen, borrowed, guessed or intercepted. Internet users have become used to providing personal information to any convincing-looking box that appears on a screen. They have little idea of either the technology that helps to provide electronic security in practice or the theoretical principles that determine whether it will work. According to Mr Cameron, â€œthere is no consistent and comprehensible framework allowing them to evaluate the authenticity of the sites they visit, and they don't have a reliable way of knowing when they are disclosing private information to illegitimate parties. At the same time they lack a framework for controlling or even remembering the many different aspects of their digital existence.â€ Personally I agree with the principle, Government should minimise the information it keeps to that it actually requires and should otherwise f*ck off and stop interfering.