HMS Daring to be delayed until 2010

Discussion in 'The Fleet' started by Bisley, Dec 11, 2007.

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  1. Would be interesting to know if this came from something that broke, something that didn't work as intended or something that the MoD decided to add at the last minute. It takes two to tango (or in this case, buy a ship): one to ask for the ship, and one to make it.
     
  2. No suprise at all, it happens every time we procure anything.

    Who actually procures these items need to actually re assess their ability to beleive the actual costs they are told against what the real costs will be.
    Add to that the so called dates they would be available is never achieved.
     
  3. Again, we don't know why the delay. There have been some projects delayed because of ineffectual suppliers, others because the MoD as the customer kept changing what they wanted, or didn't say what they wanted at the outset.
     
  4. Yet ANOTHER Big And Expensive fiasco…

    Over £1 billion for a ship that's got hardly any weapons fit?

    FFS! What are they building it out of? 24ct gold with mink lined bunks and diamond encrusted taps?

    Stop buying British… PERIOD!

    It's always the same, a decade late with an absolutely eyewatering price tag.

    The US Navy pays £2.2 billion for a Nimitz class carrier and £550 million for an Arleigh Burke Destroyer… Someone at BAE is taking the piss with a vengence.


    After this I think you can definately kiss T45 hulls 7 & 8 goodbye and probably 5 & 6 also.
     
  5. When you read the NAO report, it really doesn't look good.

    http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/07-08/070898ii.pdf

    The vast majority of the escalation is due to the "Six Ship proposal" from BAEs, which unfortunately appears to be tacit acknowledgement that six is yer lot. In other words, HMT has asked them to recost their programme against six ships rather than the "required" eight. Funnily enough, the project summary sheet explicitly says number required = six, which appears to be the first offical announcement - and not even by HMG!

    Some of that added cost will be BAEs putting sunk programme cost that was amortised over eight (or 12!) ships onto six. Even so, it's still taking the p1ss.

    What is instructive is to look at the table showing how the cost has varied over the history of the programme, where you see the endless fiddling about with one or two million here and there and the "pretend" costs like "cost of capital" that theh beanies force the projects to apply. I reiterate - BAES are taking the p1ss, but their ability to do so is being aided and abetted by HMG/HMT and the actual values used need to be treated with caution - we just don't know what is in the costs, or how much is "real" or "beanie-induced".
     
  6. No wonder it's costing so much the inside is like a cruise liner lol
     
  7. Just a few points.

    The price quoted for the Arleigh Burke above is the drive away price, not the total programme price, and there is no way HMG would be able to buy one off the slip at that price. Frome the NAO document the drive away price for the 45 is £650M a price that has gone up some 10% or so over the programme.

    Once again if you look at the NAO document the BAE contract is a price limited one so every price rise has to be justified, why did the MOD agree to the rises? Yes a big chunk is due to the MOD saying to adjust the price to reflect only 6 guaranteed, as the design and engineering costs represent around 50% of the total price then perhaps after you have divied that by 6 and not 8 then it is not surprising the price goes up. Equally a lot of the rises have been due to changes in the costs of the PAAMS not something that can be laid at BAes door.

    Yes I know that some of the problems are down to us in industry getting things wrong and mistakes cost money and time, but there is an at least equall responsibility of the MOD in changeing it's mind, and every time they chage their mind it costs time and money too.

    US kit may look flashy and good, but remember no beer fridges and the drive away cost for Johnny Foreigner is never the same as for UNcle Sam, andyou don't get the workshop manual just the user manual.
     
  8. Just a few points…

    £650 million isn't so good when you look at what's left off… and in the case of the T45, that's just about everything. So they charge us £700 million, even £800 million?… it's still a bargain as it packs far more firepower than a T45 in the same size hull for less than the programme cost of the T45.

    And I keep hearing this bull that the Yanks will charge us more, not sell us the handbooks, yadyaya…

    Lets see now, with current kit we seem to do just fine with Predator, AH-64, C-17, GR7/9, C-130, E-3D, CH-47, Tomahawk, MLRS, Paveway, Sidewinder, AMRAAM, Brimstone, Trident D5, Harpoon……

    So I suppose we get rip off pricing and no handbooks with all those (and other) systems…


    Evrything BAE touches turns to shit and we need to change the dealer we buy our war canoes from.
     
  9. This is one area I have sympathy with thte Government. A programme is announced providing 12 ships at £500 million totalling £6 billion. But then unit price more than doubles so we only get six, still at over £6 billion for the programme... and yet people still demand 8-12.

    Lets just accept 6, but they should be gold plated with everything for that price.
     
  10. Uncle Sam doesn't always get it right either, all the Arleigh Burkes you covet are being sent back to be straitened and reinofrced to stop them bending again.

    You may laugh at the US ITARS regulations, but when your back is to the wall and you want a system update fast, don't ask uncle sam, he will be to busy doing his own thing, and no one in the UK will have the data to do what you want. Taking your list well of course the missiles work but you will only get an update when Uncle Sam decided to let you have it no matter how many greenbacks you wave around, and yes we only get the user manual (Eventually the yanks let some companies have more detailed info on sidewinder but even then that was only on 'export' versions. The transport A/C are not really that much of a problem. and the GR7/9 has mainly UK systems and drimstone has UK electronics and seeker. AH64 well we had just a few little problems before we could actually use them, and predator OK till you want wa new sensor or something like that.

    JSF is going to be very interesting because we are actually supposed to get the source code for that, but I am certainly waiting for data on that and there is no sign of it and no one is saying we can't have, just no one is saying when we can have it either.
     
  11. Just like all our war canoes then…
     
  12. Quite probably, the point really is just because it looks good on paper and is nice and shiny doesn't mean it is any better than the stuff you already have.
     
  13. I'd rather have 100% something that was good enough than 0% of perfect.

    And last time I checked, they have nearly 60 of theirs in service, we will have exactly 0 of ours this side of 2010 at the earliest
     
  14. Do none of you find it a coincidence that the Defence Budget has a hole in it and a major programme is "slipped". This has all the marks of an "expenditure reprofiling". Key elements don't have to fail, nothing has to change or be added and BAES doesn't have to do anything wrong. It just has to accept smaller payments over a longer period; and that will cost money. It's the in year spend that matters.

    You've heard of spend to save? Well, this is save to spend or, more likely, not get.

    The clues are everywhere.
    http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/page13971.asp
    http://downingstreetsays.com/briefings/2007/12/04/5003
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/military/story/0,,2221531,00.html
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/10/28/ntroops128.xml
     
  15. I think one of the issues is that ''expenditure profiling'' and ''expenditure re-profiling'' are a big part of the problem.

    To make a programme ''affordable'' in the eyes of the IAB the profile has to be smoothed to the extent that the project teams can't actually invest what's needed in the early design stages, then can't buy enough of the solution to develop a critical mass.

    The expenditure profiling also means that the solution doesn't meet the requirement and the good ideas clubs in the four HQs then have plenty of opportunity to inject change requests.

    Vicious circle and I'm ont convinced I see a way out. Buying someone elses solution isn't really the answer anyway, endemic issues with the acquisition structure and culture will affect that in the same way. I can think of a couple of ''OTS'' buys which have been crippled as a result of it.
     

  16. Nah… MOD is incapable of setting realistic goals within it's budgetary contraints. BAE promise the sun, moon and stars within said budget. MOD lacks the competence or gumption to realise they are being sold a dummy and it can't be done.
     
  17. It's very easy to say ''MOD is at fault'', but it tends to oversimplify the situation. To an extent I'd agree that MOD is at fault, but that's largely because of the implementation of Smart Acquisition rather than being an amorphous blob of civil servants intent on ******* things up for plucky salt of the earth jack et al.

    MOD is an organisation made up of some 400,000 people, if we include all those in uniform. The acquisition organisation is made up of Civil Servants, Uniformed personnel and a fair number of external contractors.

    The acquisition system has at least three different bodies related to each project, each with competing and mutually exclusive goals. The Equipment Capability customer is interested in getting the money and will use a range of accounting devices to achieve that, the profiling that PoL highlighted and I commented on is one of those things. Personally I believe that the sleight of hand that the EC has to do in order to get the nod from the IAB is the root of most of our acquisition problems.

    At the other end is the end user and their representative, in our case Fleet N7 (or whatever it's called this week). Minimal political awareness and an unrealistic expectation of what can be achieved, plus a tendency to be risk averse and not particularly interested in doing anything differently. No budget to speak of.

    It's not just BAES that do that, every big manufacturing and systems integration vendor promises the earth then screws the client, it's just that BAES is in the spotlight justnow, it was EDS a year or so ago, Accenture last year with the cock up over NHS IT and I can't recall the name of the consortium lead that screwed Transport for London over the tube.

    Govenrment departments in general are abysmal at managing their contracts, it's just that MOD has bigger contracts than most.
     
  18. Karma

    I'd agree with most of that, but you missed out the Abbeywood massive, whatever they're called now. I think you're a bit high in your estimate of numbers as well. I count just over 100000 pongoes, 40000 crabs, nearly 40000 in the mob and 28000 in DE&S, adding up to just over 200000.

    There really aren't another 200000 serpents in MB or elsewhere, so I'd say MoD as a whole is somewhere well south of 225000.
     
  19. FlagWagger

    FlagWagger Book Reviewer

     

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