Help Needed - Loss of HMS Sheffield

brendan498

War Hero
being in the arse end of a 21 during the attack I can only say i was greatly Inspired by the Courage of the crew of the Sheffield in the way they performed during and after the event, as it happened so early on in the conflict is a credit to the morale fibre of all the Ships involved throughout the War
 

flymo

War Hero
Just anecdotal here and as mentioned in an earlier post, some 28 years have bimbled past, but I joined Illustrious at the tail end of '83. The PO(EW) there was " 'B' H" and in '82 was a killick EW on the Sheff.

He told me that before jumping off the Sheff, he wrote down the parameters of the Exocet missile head radar onto the back of his hand as they had gone Down South not knowing the radar parameters. So I can understand the entry H5 @ 1402 55 sec from here that the paramters were being looked up at the time.
God the EW documentation was shocking then. I am sure (hope) it's better now.
 
W

white_mafia

Guest
Although serving at the time, I did not go to the Falklands but my best oppo was a CMEA(P) on the Sheffield.

He survived the attack and spent many months on rehab in a burns unit, eventually returning to Gosport, facially disfigured, and bad burns to both hands. We hosted his return in his local in Gosport, and listened to his anecdotes. He was on watch at the time that the Exocet struck, and was 100% certain that the warhead did not explode. The damage was caused by the propellant.

I have his name and current whereabouts if you wish to pm me.
 

Allnightin

Lantern Swinger
This is Nick Batho's statement on the SHEFFIELD attack as posted on the Save Our Shipmates website around the time the BoI papers were released to the public in 2006:

The Loss of HMS SHEFFIELD


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gentlemen. My name is Nick Batho and I have just become aware of this forum. In view of the considerable interest shown by many contributers in what I did or did not do, where I was at any given time and my reasons for my actions, I thought I should immediately post this message for you all to read. I have withheld nothing and what follows is the absolute truth, clouded only by the passing of time.

First some background information. Before bring sent down south, SHEFFIELD was returning home from a Gulf deployment. The Operational Effectiveness of the ship at the end of the deployment was not particularly high. This is because it was impossible to get decent AAW training on deployment due to the lack of suitable assets and skills were not well honed. It was over 6 months since the ship had been to Portland. During the passage south, some training was achieved, but once on station there was virtually no training against live targets due to the need to deploy ships and aircraft on operational missions. We were particularly forbidden to lock up on our own Sea Harriers due to the fact that the Argentines had their own Type 42's'

The Captain, Sam Salt, had joined mid-deployment and had not been onboard during the pre-deployment work-up. As a submariner he had only very limited knowledge of AAW. The XO had been present for the work-up, but he was a rotary wing aviator and so he too had little or no knowledge of how to fight a Type 42 from the Ops Room. I mention this because in Defence Watches it would have been normal to have the Co and the XO working opposite each other in the Ops room as the Command. This did not happen in SHEFFIELD, I think, but cannot be sure, this is because the background of these 2 officers would not have fitted them for this task. What it meant was that we had one less warfare officer in the chain of Command than might have been expected. As the Ops Officer, with only 1 year in as a LtCdr, I felt this lack of top cover in the Ops Room and in our planning and operational discussions very much.

The Threat. At the time of the attack the ship was in receipt of a mass of highly classified intelligence information regarding the capability of the Argentines and the weapons which they had available. It was clearly stated in one of these signals that, although they had some air launched Exocet missiles, they had NOT been able to integrate them with the Super E launch platform. Clearly we all know now that this was wrong - but at the time it was something which I noted and took seriously. The air threat against ships was stated to be iron bombs. The aiming system for these bombs was a visual sight and so for there to be a threat, the pilots had to be able to see their target.

The Attack. On the day in question the TF was at Air Threat Warning Yellow. I cannot now recall the exact definition of this state but it was one down from the top. As I recall, we had been at ATW Yellow for several days without any sign of Argentine Aircraft or any indication of an attack. SHEFFIELD had been at Defence watches for the same length of time, but without the watch and watch about routine of CO/XO in the Ops Room which was certainly the case in ships I served in later in my career. I say without any sign of an attack, but there had been numerous scares/false alarms about the AGAVE radar (codename I think was Condor). This was because the characteristics of Condor were very similar to the characteristics of the radar in the Sea Harrier. Each time Condor had been called, it subsequently transpired to be the Sea Harrier. This naturally led us all to be very circumspect when Condor was mentioned. I would like at this stage to mention something about Chaff. Part of the well practised response to an incoming missile threat was to deploy both Chaff C (for Confusion - fired by the 4.5'') and then Chaff D (for distraction fired by the 3'' rockets). A factor in the decision to fire Chaff D which has not been mentioned was that we only had (I think) about 48 rockets onboard. At 16 rockets per pattern this means we only had enough rockets for 3 full patterns of D. I know with hindsight this seem ridiculous and wrong (which it was) but I am sure there was an inbuilt reluctance to deploy Chaff D until we were sure that a missile was on its way, so as not to waste our small number of missiles.

Back to the attack. Before I went on watch (at 1200 - might have been 1230) I visited the bridge. Apart from gaining a general update from the OOW, I did this specifically to check on the cloud base. This is because, based on the intelligence, we were facing a visually aimed iron bomb threat and the cloud base is a critical factor in the vulnerability which we faced. I cannot now remember what the cloud base (NOT the cloud cover) was but I do know that estimating it is something which it is easy for the more inexperienced to get wrong. At sometime during my watch I asked the OOW on Openline to check the cloud base for me. He came back with a figure which was significantly different to the base which I had seen before going on watch. This concerned me because, if he was correct there was now a significant change in the potential threat which we faced. A high base meant we were vulnerable whereas a low base meant that we could not be attacked since the pilots could not see the target. The OOW concerned was one of the less experienced and so I decided, taking into consideration the long period without any other activity, that due to the importance in my mind of this estimate, that I would visit the bridge to see for myself. Remember that intelligence had told us to expect iron bombs and not exocet. Iron bombs can only be launched when the attack aircraft is on top of its target. This meant that we would have plenty of warning of an attack should one develop. This thinking (about warning time) also influenced my decision to visit the bridge. Once on the bridge I spent a short time looking at the cloud base and conversing with the OOW. All this time I could keep in touch with what was happening in the Ops Room since the OOW was on Open line. I should add that at Defence watches it was quite normal for the PWO and/or the AAW to leave the Ops Room to visit the MCO to read signal traffic -particularly the highly classsified signals. At the time I did not regard it as wrong to visit the bridge to check on the cloud base. Clearly now, with hindsight, I wish that I had thought differently and believed the OOW, but I cannot change what happened, however much I wish I could. I would though like to reject absolutely the suggestion by some of your correspondents that I was skiving off because the CO was in his cabin and I thought I could 'get away with it'. The truth of the matter is as I have explained. After discussing things with the bridge team for a while, I left to go back to the Ops Room. There are 2 ladders which come out on 2 deck next to the Ops Room, one on each side of the ship. One of these ladders comes down the other side of a watertight door in the Port passageway and requires you to go through it to get into the Ops Room, the other comes out in the Stbd passageway the same side of the door as the Ops Room and lets you get into the Ops Room without opening a Watertight Door. As we were at 2Y the doors were closed, normally at 3X they would have been open. I decided to go down the ladder on the Starboard side which would avoid me opening a W/T door to get to the Ops Room. Going down this way took me close to my cabin on the SAME level as the Wardroom and I did go into my cabin to look at a Top Secret Pack to check the details of the aiming system for the Iron bombs used by the Argentines. This information was not readily available in the Ops Room as it was contained in a TS Codeword signal which could not be left around for anyone to read. Having checked on the data in the pack - which required me to open my safe, I went through the wardroom and the pantry so that I could get to the ladder on the Starboard side, thus avoiding the need to open a W/T door. On going through the Wardroom, I meet a small group of stewards. They asked me how things were going and, aware of how isolated they must have felt not being privvy to any of the operational information, I took a few moments to talk to them and to try and reassure tham that they were safe and that all was well. It may well be that I was given a cup of coffee during this converstaion but the coffee was NOT my reason for being in the W/R. It was simply on my route to the Ops Room. Whilst I was having this converstaion I heard a Main Broadcast pipe (AAWO OPs Room). I immediately shot down the ladder outside the aft pantry door and into the Ops Room. The PWO met me and said 'Condor' had been reported. I think, but cannot now be sure, he meant this had been reported by another unit. I went to my seat, put on my headphones and immediately asked the Fighter Controller if he had any CAP on the reported bearing. He answered in the negative. I then turned my attention to my display and could see a mass of autotrack 'eggs' and possibly one or two close or closing confirmed tracks. I spoke to the APR(L) who said that the trackers were doing their best to establish confirmed tracks. There was a frenzy of activity on the display and I was aware of the Missile Gun Director Blind standing Seadart 'to' but he was not able to achieve a lock onto any target with the 909 radar. I did not deploy Chaff D since I could not be sure what was happening. I am sure I was influenced in this decision by the acute shortage of Chaff rockets I mention above and by the fact that I was expecting only iron bomb attacks. The next thing I was aware of was a 'thump' hitting the ship. Not a large explosion - more like a heavy bump during an alongside. After the hit, I think the EWD reported that he had picked up Exocet missile head parameters. Throughout this short period I did not hear or make any external transmissions on my headset. I cannot be sure but I would have expected to be on AAWC UHF with the other pickets although they were at extreme UHF range. I cannot comment on any exchanges on other circuits.

As you all know the SCOT was transmitting just before the attack and since it used the same part of the frequency spectrum as the Agave radar we would have been blind to Agave and exocet head during transmission. Permission to transmit on Scot would have been given taking into account the factors I have already mentioned -ie several days at ATW Yellow/Defence watches without incident. Clearly we had to use it at some stage to pick up our signal traffic and could not keep SCOT silent for ever. I do not know from my own knowledge, but I would have expected the PWO to order 'strangle SCOT' as soon as he was aware of the Condor report. The fact that we subsequently picked up the missile head would support this.

Turning to my own thoughts on all this. As one of your correspondents stated, my name has been banded about on television and in the papers (and on this site) as the man responsible for the loss of SHEFFIELD. That has been very hard for me to live with and even more hard for my family. There are few who have to carry the burden of the loss of 20 men with them for ever. Which of you reading this would like to attend a reunion feeling the way I do? I would like to emphasise that there is no question of any other members of the ships company being "asleep" or in any way being slack or lazy in the carrying out of their duties. Everyone did their absolute best in very very difficult circumstances.
As another of your correspondents said - time heals very very slowly and of course all that you are doing, with which I have no argument, only slows the process down even more - particularly for the berieved. I have never before committed my side of events to paper/e-mail. I would be the first to admit that I made a serious error of judgement and I should have stayed in the Ops Room throughout my watch. The only thing I would say is that there is no certainty that if I had, the outcome would have been different. Nevertheless, I apologise without reservation for my mistakes and hope that by reading this you can at least come to a better understanding of what I did, why I did it and sense the humility and sadness I feel about the events which happened so far away, so long ago.
 
D

Deleted 493

Guest
... Batho's statement ...
Hmm. As any fule no who knows 42's, his ship knowledge doesn't quite match up here. Had he used the direct route ... Ops Room to Bridge ... he would have used the transit ladders on the starboard side of the Ops Room, up one deck, wardroom flat, up another deck, outside the charthouse and up to the bridge. If he was stood in the pantry, he was in J section. His route to the Ops Room would be down, through a door (not in the Red Risk zone so therefore not shut at Yankee and through H section, through another door and into the Ops Room. Quite why he doesn't admit he was back aft in the pantry and have done with it, is a mystery. He wasn't responsible for the loss of Sheffield any more than the Tiller Flat wtachkeeper was. The navy was built for a purpose, had allowed shit to slip and wasn't prepared for the attack. Not his fault. Systemic failure rather than personal. He sounds like he is digging a bigger hole than was already dug, by justifying being away from his posting. He may have gone to the bridge for a goof, passed back to the bunhouse for a brew and unfortunately, that is exactly when the attack happened. Ten minutes later he could have been sat at his plot and done something about it. Blathering endlessly in mitigation and getting the facts wrong does nothing to better his case.

levers
 

brigham600

War Hero
Very good points made by Levers concering the routes and location of the ship and I would have thought he would have got that right in all honesty.

Also, regarding SCOT, it would never have been on 'permanent' transmit anyway, as there was no dedicated access in those days such as we have now. The MCO would only have gone 'UP' on the Satcom transmit leg when they had signal traffic to send or to make a DSSS Call. (A DSSS call was happening at the time of the attack) There was no need to actually be in the transmit mode to receive signals, as that was achieved using a 'broadcast' system utilising the Satcom receive leg.

The use of the term strangle SCOT was a call made by the on watch PWO and would be made over AI or Signal Intercom, with the Radio Operators then switching off SCOT immediately at the terminal located in the MCO.

I would have thought an Operations Officer would have had knowledge of this to be honest.
 
I guess in trying to be fair to the man, the article was written many years after the event and although a PWO he is not, perhaps unlike Brigham and myself a Comms specialist, and so the details of SCOT would be vague at best. Indeed, as Brigham probably knows, Comms to most serving PWO's was/is vague at the best of times!

(For the unititiated - SCOT - Satellite Communications Onboard Terminal. This was the ships main strategic satellite system mainly used in those days for links back to the UK for voice and messaging with a bit of data and imagary. In 1982 the RN probably led the world in satellite comms afloat and SCOT was a massive plus in the Falklands war. But, such systems were still in their infancy and there was lots we didn't know which we learned to our cost.
 

the_ullage

Midshipman
Sparkers27 either we've met before or there is another guy working on Sheffield whose work is probably ahead of yours. Did you go to the world ship society thing in Bristol a few months ago and get on a London Paddington bound train afterwards with a couple of other people who'd been at said event?
 
I think I know the person you are referring to. I have never met him but his focus is more upon the Type 42s in general. It includes the Conventry as well.
 

the_ullage

Midshipman
Might well be. I can't actually remember his name but I have seen a piece he was writing about Sheffield although I think it touched on other 42s as well.
 

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