I find it incredibly sad when individuals such as Dr Gordon feel a desire to denigrate the past sacrifices and achievements of others just so that they can write a novelty essay with a fresh perspective on history. I know Dr Gordon and have been lectured many times by him. He is a real gentleman but, sadly, I gained the impression that he's one of those academics whose intelligence is not matched by his appreciation for the realities of combat.
Nevertheless, I've always felt that the threat posed by the RN to the Kreigsmarine was underestimated in analyses of why Germany never invaded. The German invasion fleet was tenuous at best and Grossadmiral Raeder was always a proponent of defeating Britain by naval blockade rather than direct invasion. However, Germany most certainly had a credible airborne assault capability which could have seized key airfields near Dover. Combined with the air superiority that thankfully they never gained, imho they had sufficient naval forces to make a successful landing in S England. However, Raeder stressed from the outset that air superiority was an absolute pre-requisite for the Kreigsmarine to conduct and support an amphibious invasion.
Individuals such as oilslick and potential officer should also reflect 2 other factors in the equation. Firstly, it is possible and indeed likely that Italy would have committed key elements of it's very powerful fleet to support the Kreigsmarine in any invasion. Italy committed it's air force to the latter stages of the Battle of Britain although they were routed by the RAF. However, their Navy would have significantly bolstered the Axis chances of success. This is another area where the influence of the RN has perhaps not been acknowledged in that any Italian Naval intervention would have required passage past Malta and through the straits of Gibraltar where it would no doubt have attracted the attentions of the senior (and junior!) service.
Secondly, the RAF itself (as with the FAA of course) had a not-inconsiderable anti-ship capability at the time, although nothing like what the UK had by 1942ish. This was another factor why Raeder placed so much emphasis upon air superiority.
I think therefore that the RN was certainly a factor in 1940. However, it is frankly insulting to suggest that it was the primary factor. As has been stated, Crete, the Malta convoys, the Russian convoys and Singapore are just a few examples of what happens when naval forces lack their own air superiority. Oilslick cites Dunkirk as an example of how inefficient the German air attacks would have been. Yet he conveniently forgets that there were intensive air battles between the RAF and Luftwaffe during the evacuation which greatly limited the numbers of aircraft getting through. Indeed, these were probably some of the most intensive ops conducted by Fighter Command during the war after the Battle of Britain itself.
The simple fact is that, without the air superiority won by the RAF and FAA pilots, the RN would have needed to have been kept at some distance from the Straights of Dover to avoid constant air attacks. This would have reduced their reaction time, especially when the RAF would have been unable to provide recce of the Channel ports to provide the indications and warning of invasion needed to attack.
Any naval reaction to invasion would therefore have been late, and would have been unable to stop the simultaneous airborne assault. The RN would have then been a massive problem to maintaining the German SLOCs to support the invasion forces. However, to do so they would have been subject to constant air attack by bomb and torpedo equipped (Ju-88 and He-115) aircraft.
Raeder acknowledged the imperitive of air superiority. Hitler acknowledged the imperitive of air superiority. Perhaps it is time that the likes of Dr Gordon, oilslick and PO also acknowledge facts. The RN was a factor in 1940, and a significant one. But let's stop frankly insulting the sacrifices of others and stop trying to re-write history.
Regards,
MM