My understanding is that all members of the Cdo roled Rifles battalion will be commando trained - simple. This will take a little time, but not as much as some seem to imagine. It's already a "project in progress", and 80%+ of candidates are getting through AACC.
The whole point of the Infantry restructuring is to make more troops available for ops by giving each battalion of the new "big regiments" specific roles (light, mech, armoured) in which they'll specialise; under the traditional regimental system, when most battalions re-roled every 4 years, about 25% of the Infantry was unavailable for ops at any given time due to the continual need for re-roling training etc.. The Royal Australian Regt has operated a "big regt/ specialist battalion" system for some time, and it seems to work well for them: although, of course, their commando roled battalion operates rather like the SFSG, rather than as part of a separate amphibious corps.
Now, realistically, how likely is it that the "fat knackers", poorly motivated, or aged time servers will put themselves forward for commando training? Also, are the "powers that be" in the Rifles likely to want to risk massive embarrassment, humiliation, "Royal finger pointing" etc because loads of their blokes fail AACC? It is, therefore, likely that Rifles candidates opting to serve in 1st Battalion will be young Riflemen, JNCOs, and officers who have a few years service, have seen the opportunity available, and volunteer for it with a realistic appreciation of what's required.
They are likely to be fit, motivated, and generally switched-on. They will not be raw recruits starting from scratch - even the least experienced will have undergone 24 weeks Infantry training (not the same as the RM 32 weeks full fattybombatty, but not insignificant either: as someone else has quite rightly noted, your bog standard Brit infanteer is a lot better trained than most other infantrymen, no matter what some RM think!), and most will have done far more than this, incl operational experience.
I think this represents a great opportunity for all concerned, and with the right attitude from all parties, given time, it will work very well to mutual advantage, not least in promoting much needed "jointery".
Final note - I'm a bit tired of the constant digs at 5 Bde "down South". As stated elsewhere, it was a victim of "ad hockery", and was unprepared for war. But, some ought to consider that 2 Para was from 5 Bde - removed and attached to 3 Cdo in April '82. So 5 Bde went to war having lost its only truly fit for role battalion - this added considerably to the organisational confusion. Despite all the problems, 2 SG went direct from public duties and fought & won a nasty little battle (against predominantly regular troops - marines, in the main - in well prepared positions) on Tumbledown. And what of the Gherkins? Many cried tears of frustration when the Argentinians surrendered, thus depriving them of their chance to "close with the enemy": no shortage of motivation there!
There was nothing much wrong, all things considered, with the troops of 5 Bde; a lot was wrong with C3, formation readiness (eg Bde command had never even had the opportunity to conduct proper TEWTs, let alone anything else!), and clarity of thinking about their mission. But don't, please, persist in knocking the soldiers - in the main, they "done good", and frankly a lot of the derisory comments are a disgrace to the memory of those who died, and show a lack of appreciation of just how handicapped 5 Bde was.
Wessex_Man.
